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JEB. v.

ALABAMA EX REL

TB:. DISCRIMINATION

BY ANY

OTHER NAME...
INTRODUCTION

In 1986, the Supreme Court ruled in Batson v. Kentucky' that peremptory challenges 2 motivated by race violated the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause.3 In 1994, in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B.,4 the
Court extended Batson to include gender-based peremptory challenges.
Pursuant to Batson and JE.B., once a litigant demonstrates a prima facie
case of race or gender discrimination, the party accused of discrimination
must come forward with a race or gender-neutral explanation for exercising the peremptory challenge. Lower court implementation of Batson and
lower court proscription of gender-based peremptory challenges motivated by gender prior toJE.B.indicate, however, that courts readily accept
explanations for peremptory challenges that are merely pretexts 5 for discrimination. This history suggests that JE.B. will not, in fact, eliminate
gender discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges. In order
to rid the jury selection process of this and all types of discrimination, the
peremptory challenge system should be abolished and replaced with a
procedure that will prevent the injection of bigotry into American
courtrooms.

6

1. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
2. A peremptory challenge is the right to challenge ajuror without assigning, or being
required to assign, a reason for the challenge. In most jurisdictions each party to an action,
both civil and criminal, has a specified number of such challenges. After a party has used all
her peremptory challenges, she is required to utilize challenges for cause to eliminate potentialjurors. BLACK'S LAw DICrlONARY 1136 (6th ed. 1990).
3. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that "[n]o state shall make or enforce
any law which shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws").
4. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
5. While trial court acceptance of litigants' pretextual explanations serves as ajustification for the elimination of the peremptory challenge system, the argument for elimination is
further supported by the fact that the Batson and JE.B. decisions failed to address many
important issues which will undoubtedly give rise to substantial litigation and judicial inefficiency. These issues include the absence of an adequate standard by which to determine
whether a party has established a prima facie case of improper exclusion, the appropriate
remedy upon a finding of improper exclusion, and the ability of a litigant to raise a Batson
challenge where the opposing party excluded members of the panel who were of a particular
race or gender, but where the petit jury nevertheless included members of the excluded
class. See generally Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 153 (1989).
6. While this Comment calls for the abolition of the peremptory challenge system because it engenders discrimination in the jury selection process, at least one commentator has
suggested that peremptories should be eliminated because the Supreme Court cannot limit
the application of Batson to race and gender. Eventually, argues this commentator, the Court
will "have to protect everyone," and because the peremptory challenge will no longer be
exercised with full freedom, it must be eliminated. J. Christopher Peters, Note, Georgia v.
McCollum: It's Strike Three for Peremptory Challenges, but Is it the Bottom of the Ninth?, 53 LA. L.
REv. 1723, 1757-58 (1993).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1

Part I of this Comment provides a brief background of the jury selection process and the role of the peremptory challenge. Part I also explores the history of race and gender discrimination in the jury selection
process. Part II offers an in-depth discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in JE.B. Part III discusses the purposes supposedly served by the peremptory challenge, as well as the harms suffered by those who are
excluded from jury service due to the discriminatory exercise of this device. Additionally, Part III examines the inability of courts to distinguish
between legitimate reasons for peremptory strikes and those that serve as
mere pretexts for discrimination. Finally, Part IV suggests the replacement of the peremptory challenge system with an affirmative selection system that will serve to rid the jury selection process of discrimination.
I.

A.

BACKGROUND

The Jury Selection Process and the Peremptory Challenge

The concept of trial by jury has its origins in early Roman law. 7 In the
Anglo-Saxon tradition, the concept first appeared in 1166 A.D. with the
Assize of Clarendon, 8 which required inquiry into robbery and murder by
"the twelve most lawful men."9 In early England the members of the jury
were chosen based upon their knowledge of the event at issue. This principle developed into the view that, in order to assure an impartial jury,
members of the jury pool should know nothing of the instant litigation.1 0
The trial by jury system immigrated to America with the colonists who traveled from England. 11 Subsequently, it became a protected right in the
United States under the Sixth Amendment 1 2 for criminal proceedings and
under the Seventh Amendment 13 for many civil proceedings.
In order to implement properly this constitutional safeguard, a fair
procedure for selecting ajury is necessary. 14 While theJury Selection and
Service Act of 1968,15 which governs jury selection, does not dictate a particular method of assembling a venire or jury panel, courts most often
utilize voter registration lists to select randomly a cross section of the community. Once the venire or jury panel is selected, the judge, often with
7. See id,at 1725; see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 119 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (discussing

trial procedure in ancient Rome).
8. The "Assize of Clarendon" was a series of ordinances initiated by King Henry II of
England in an assembly of lords at the royal hunting lodge of Clarendon. These ordinances
attempted to improve procedures in criminal law and established the grand jury system consisting of twelve men. 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITrANNicA 348 (1985); see also S. Alexandria Jo, Comment, Reconstruction of the Peremptory Challenge System: A Look at Gender-Based Peremptory
Challenges, 22 PAC. L.J. 1305, 1306 n.7 (1991).
9. Peters, supra note 6, at 1725-26.
10. Id. at 1726.
11. Id.
12. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing that "the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury" in all criminal prosecutions).
13. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (providing that "the right of trial by jury shall be preserved" for all suits at common law where the value at controversy exceeds twenty dollars).
14. Peters, supra note 6, at 1726.
15. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-78 (1988).

1994]

PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES

the aid of counsel, conducts a voir dire' 6 examination of the prospective
jurors. Voir dire is conducted to ascertain whether the prospective jurors
are acquainted with the facts of the case or the parties involved in the
dispute. 17 The parties aim, through voir dire, to determine whether the
prospective jurors have a predisposition regarding the merits of the case.' 8
The jurors primarily are asked questions regarding their backgrounds,
work, and families. 19 With this information, the litigants strive to discern
whether the potential jurors harbor any biases that would hinder their
ability to serve fairly and impartially as jurors.
After voir dire, the parties may strike a potential juror from the panel
for cause. 20 Cause challenges must be exercised on the basis of articulated
bias. 2 ' Such challenges allow parties to eliminate jurors for "narrowly specified, provable, and legally cognizable" reasons. 22 Pursuant to cause challenges, jurors who have exhibited actual or implied bias may be excluded.
Actual bias refers to the potential juror's subjective state of mind, while
implied bias is presumed by law from the existence of relationships or
interests of the juror. 2s Permissible justifications for cause challenges are
often codified, limiting removal ofjurors to situations where, for instance,
the juror has been convicted of a felony 24 or will be a witness in the litigation. 25 Trial judges are given the discretion to grant or deny cause
26
challenges.
The parties may also exercise a limited number of peremptory challenges.2 7 A peremptory challenge is the right to challenge ajuror without
assigning, or being required to assign, a reason for the challenge. The
withparties may employ peremptory challenges "without a reason stated,
28
out inquiry and without being subject to the court's control."
16. Voir dire literally means "speak the truth." 2 WAYNE R. LAFAvE &JEROLD H. IsaRAL,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.3, at 718 (1984).

17. Jo, supra note 8, at 1307.
18. Id. at 1307.
19. Id. at 1307.
20. Robert L. Harris, Note, Redefining the Harm of Peremptoy Challenges, 32 WM. & MARY L.
Rxv. 1027, 1030 (1991).
21. Karen M. Bray, Comment, Reaching the Final Chapter in the Story of Peremptory Challenges, 40 UCLA L. Rxv. 517, 519 (1992).
22. Id. at 519.
23. Susan L.McCoin, Note, Sex Discriminationin the Voir Dire Process: The Rights of Prospective FemaleJurors,58 S. CAL. L. Rxv. 1225, 1226 n.5 (1985).
24. ALA. CODE § 12-16-150(5) (1986); see also Bray, supra note 21, at 569 & n.4.
25. TEX. CIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 35.16(a)(6) (West 1989); see also Bray, supra note 21,
at 569 & n.5.
26. BrentJ. Gurney, Note, The Casefor Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials,
21 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rxv. 227, 227 (1986).
27. Harris, supra note 20, at 1030-31.
28. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965). Generally, jurisdictions utilize one of
two general challenge procedures: the "struck system" and the "sequential system." In jurisdictions that employ the struck system, the size of the jury pool is equivalent to the size of the
petitjury plus the sum of peremptories allotted to both parties. If, for example, the required
jury is twelve and each side is allowed five peremptory challenges, the jury pool will consist of
twenty-two individuals. After the jury pool is assembled and subjected to voir dire, the parties
exercise their cause challenges. Those removed for cause are replaced by other prospective
jurors who also are examined in voir dire. The parties then alternate exercising their per-
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Unlike the jury system as a whole, the Framers did not expressly incorporate peremptory challenges into the Sixth Amendment. 29 Despite this
exclusion, the Supreme Court traditionally has given the practice an elevated position. In 1887, in Hayes v. Missouri,3 0 the Supreme Court found

that
[e]xperience has shown that one of the most effective means to
free thejurybox from men unfit to be there is the exercise of the
peremptory challenge. The public prosecutor may have the
strongest reasons to distrust the character of a juror offered,
from his habits and associations, and yet find
it difficult to formu31
late and sustain a legal objection to him.
More recently, in the 1965 case Swain v. Alabama,32 the Court implied that
peremptory challenges effectuate a fair trial:
The function of the challenge is not only to eliminate extremes
of partiality on both sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors
before whom they try the case will decide on the
basis of the
33
evidence placed before them, and not otherwise.
This formidable history and the strong rhetoric adhered to by
Supreme Court justices throughout American jurisprudential history
served to fortify the lofty position the-peremptory challenge has held in
courtrooms in this country.3 4 Recently, however, a majority of Supreme
Court justices have recognized the potential and actual abuse engendered
by the exercise of peremptory challenges. With the decisions in Batson
and J.E.B., the Court has begun to chip away at a legal device that no
longer has a place in American society.

emptories against the twenty-two members of the jury pool or use all their peremptories at
once, depending on the jurisdiction. See Gurney, supra note 26, at 228.
In "sequential system"jurisdictions, the number of people assembled for voir dire equals

the size of the petit jury. After each individual is examined, the parties exercise both for
cause and peremptory challenges. The process continues until the parties exhaust their peremptories and, after completion of the challenges for cause, enough jurors remain to form a

petitjury. Id.
29. Harris, supra note 20, at 1031.
30. 120 U.S. 68 (1887).
31. Id. at 71; see also Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894) ("The right to
challenge a given number of jurors without showing cause is one of the most important of
the rights secured to the accused . . . . Any system for the empaneling of a jury that
pre [v] ents or embarrasses the full, unrestricted exercise by the accused of that right, must be
condemned.").

32. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
33. Id. at 219.
34. While the judiciary in the United States has concentrated on eliminating racial and
gender discrimination in the use of the peremptory challenge, Canada has recently equalized
the number of challenges given to each side and England has eliminated the peremptory
challenge entirely. Except for special circumstances, jurors under English and Canadian sys-

tems cannot be questioned about their beliefs and prejudices during voir dire nor can they
be investigated prior to trial. SeeJudith Heinz, Peremptoy Challenges in Criminal Cases: A Companson of Regulation in the United States, England, and Canada, 16 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoOp. L.J.
201, 205-206 (1993) (comparing the history and current status of peremptory challenges in
the United States, England, and Canada).
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The History of Racial DiscriminationinJury Selection

In 1879, the Supreme Court in Strauderv. West Virginia3 5 held that a
West Virginia statute 36 that excluded blacks from service on grand and
petit juries3 7 violated the Equal Protection Clause.3 8 This landmark decision established for the first time that a state could not exclude deliberately a racial group from jury service. For almost a century after Strauder,
the Court upheld the right of racial minorities to serve on juries through
proper inclusion in the jury selection process.3 9 In 1965, however, the
Court held in Swain v. Alabama4° that a prosecutor's discriminatory intent
in the use of peremptory challenges could only be demonstrated by evidence of the systematic removal of African-Americans from juries over a
period of time.4 1 This "crippling burden of proof" 42 effectively rendered
43
the peremptory challenge immune from equal protection challenges.
The Court subsequently recognized, however, an excluded juror's interest
in nondiscriminatory jury selection 44 and the harm to the judicial process
45
caused by such discrimination.
In 1986, in line with these developments, the Court overruled Swain
in Batson v. Kentucky.4 6 In Batson, the Court eased the defendant's burden
of proof, ruling that evidence of a discriminatory pattern of peremptory
challenges in a defendant's own trial may be sufficient to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination. 4 7 Once a defendant establishes a prima facie
case, the state must come forward with race-neutral explanations for peremptorily challenging racial minorities. 48 Since the Batson decision, the
35. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
36. The West Virginia statute provided: "All white male persons who are twenty-one
years of age and who are citizens of this State shall be liable to serve as jurors, except as
herein provided." Id. at 305.
37. It is the duty of a grand jury to receive "complaints and accusations in criminal cases,
hear the evidence adduced on the part of the state, and find bills of indictment in cases
where they are satisfied a trial ought to [occur]." A petit jury is the ordinary jury called for
the trial of civil or criminal actions. BLACK's LAw DicrioNARY 855-56 (6th ed. 1990).
38. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
39. See Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947) (holding that once a prima facie case
has been established, the burden is on the state to prove that the exclusion is not racially
motivated); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (ruling that testimony of witnesses establishing the total exclusion of blacks from jury service made out a prima facie case of the
denial of equal protection). SeegenerallyWilliam D. Griggs, Recent Development, 50 TEa. L.
Rav. 385, 389 (1983) (examining the history of racial discrimination in the jury selection
process).
40. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
41. Id. at 227.
42. Batson, 476 U.S. at 92 (overruling the burden of proof established in Swain).
43. Warren D. Hayes, Recent Development, State v. Knox: The Louisiana Supreme Court
Expands Equal Protection on Racially Motivated Peremptory Challenges, 68 TUL. L. REv. 713, 715
(1994).
44. See, e.g., Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 329 (1970).
45. See, e.g., Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502-03 (1972).
46. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
47. Id at 96.
48. Id.
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Court has repeatedly affirmed and expanded the application of the Equal
49
Protection Clause to race-based peremptory challenges.
C.

The History of Gender Discrimination in Jury Selection

During the second half of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court
held that exclusion of African-American males from jury service was unconstitutional. 50 The total exclusion of women from juries, however, endured well into the twentieth century. 5 1 Derived from English common
law, 52 this exclusion was justified as a means by which women could be
5
shielded from the gruesome and shocking realities of the courtroom, 3
because women were thought too delicate and naive to witness the brutal
54
scenes depicted within the courtroom.
To advance gender-motivated jury selection claims, criminal defendants have utilized both the Sixth Amendment's right to a "fair and impar56
tial jury"55 and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
Prior to 1990, it appeared the Court would employ Sixth Amendment
logic to eliminate gender-based peremptory strikes, just as criminal defendants had effectively utilized Sixth Amendment jurisprudence to rid
57
the jury selection process of other types of gender-based discrimination.
49. See Georgia v. Carr, 113 S. Ct. 30 (1992) (requiring defense to supply race-neutral
explanations for peremptorily striking all white persons from the jury); Georgia v. McCollum,
112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992) (applying Batson to defense peremptories in criminal cases); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (extending the protection of the Equal
Protection Clause to private litigants in a civil case); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352
(1991) (accepting the parties' categorization of the excluded juror as "Latino" or "Hispanic"
and holding that, where members of such identifiable groups were excluded for reasons of
ethnicity, the use of peremptory strikes would violate Equal Protection as interpreted by Batson); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (ruling that a defendant could raise a Batson challenge even though he was not the same race as the defendant).
50. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
51. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961) (holding that the exclusion of women from jury service was neither a due process nor an equal protection violation because
women were "still regarded as the center of home and family life").
52. See, e.g., United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that,
at common law, women were excluded from juries under the doctrine of propter defectum
sexus, literally the 'defect of sex') (quoting 2 WinuAM BLACKsrONE, COMMENTARs *362).
53. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex ret T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1423 (1994).
54. I.
55. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
Id.
56. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV,§ 1.
57. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (ruling that excluding women from jury
venires so that they may tend to their domestic responsibilities is not a sufficiently valid interest to deprive the defendant of his or her constitutional rights guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (striking down, under the Sixth
Amendment, an affirmative registration requirement that exempted women from mandatory
jury service unless they volunteered to serve); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946)
(holding that women may not be excluded from the venire in federal trials in states where
women were eligible for jury service under local law).
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In Holland v. Illinois,5 8 however, the Court refused to extend the application of the Sixth Amendment to peremptory challenges, effectively closing
the door on the possibility that the Sixth Amendment could be utilized to
rid the jury selection process of gender-based peremptory strikes. 59
Unable to eliminate gender-based peremptory strikes through application of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, proponents of eliminating
such strikes looked to the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause. This proved to be a difficult task. Unlike race, gender is not considered a suspect class for purposes ofjudicial review. 60 The Equal Protection Clause does not, therefore, subject gender-based classifications to
strict scrutiny.6 1 Such classifications are subject merely to intermediate
review. 62 Undoubtedly influenced by the fact that gender is not a suspect
classification, the Court seemingly had proscribed the application of the
Equal Protection Clause to gender-motivated peremptory strikes when it
refused to review the issue in three post-Batson cases. 63 By granting certiorari in J.E.B., however, the Court agreed to examine the issue in depth.
II.

A.

J.E.B. v. ALAMA

Ex REL

T.B.

Facts and ProceduralHistory

JE.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B. 64 originated in 1991 when the state of
65
Alabama initiated a paternity and child support action against J.E.B.
66
The State alleged thatJ.E.B. was the father of a child born to T.B. During voir dire, the state used nine of its ten peremptory challenges to strike
men from thejury.6 7 Subsequently, ajury of twelve women foundJ.E.B. to
58. 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
59. Id. at 480. The Court stated that although the Sixth Amendment requires a representative venire panel in order to be considered an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross
section of the community, "[i]t has never included the notion that, in the process of drawing
the jury ....
initial representativeness cannot be diminished by allowing both the accused
and the State to eliminate persons thought to be inclined against their interest." Id.
60. While sex is not a suspect class, a plurality of justices agreed that "classifications
based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, and national origin, are inherently suspect and must therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny." Fontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (citations omitted).
61. Strict scrutiny requires that state legislation be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2818 (1993).
62. Under intermediate review, classifications must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives. Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
63. United States v. Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257, 1262 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
989 (1992); United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038, 1042 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1069 (1990); State v. Brown, 345 S.E.2d 393 (N.C.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940 (1986)
(O'Conner, J., concurring) (noting that as Batson depends on this country's profound commitment to racial equality, it should not be applied outside of the context of race-based
discrimination).
64. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
65. Id. at 1421.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1422. The trial court assembled 36 potential jurors consisting of 12 males and
24 females. After the court excused three jurors for cause, 10 of the remaining jurors were
male. The state then used 9 of its 10 peremptory strikes to remove male jurors. SinceJ.E.B.
used all but one of his strikes to remove female jurors, all the selected jurors were female. Id.
at 1421-22.
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be the father of the child. 68 J.E.B. argued the state's gender-based peremptory strikes violated the Equal Protection Clause and urged the court
to afford him the procedures required under Batson.69 The trial court
refused, concluding that Batson did not extend to gender-based peremp70
tory strikes.
B.

The Majority Opinion

InJE.B., the Supreme Court affirmed the principle that in both criminal and civil litigation, potential jurors, as well as litigants, have an equal
protection right to jury selection procedures that are free from state-sponsored intentional discrimination based upon group stereotypes that endorse and fortify prejudicial views. 71 The Court held that the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits discrimination injury selection based on gender or on the presumption that a potential juror will be biased simply
because the person is a man or a woman. 72 According to the Court, gender, like race, is an unconstitutional "proxy" ofjuror capability and objectivity. 7 3 Utilizing the heightened scrutiny standard traditionally afforded
gender-based classifications, the Court required "an exceedingly persuasive justification" for the classification. 74 The Court held that the challenges failed heightened scrutiny because they did not substantially
further the state's interest in achieving a fair and impartial jury.75 The
Court refused to accept the state's argument that gender-based peremptory challenges further this interest by eliminating a group that may be
partial to a particular defendant. 76 The state's stereotypic assertion, the
Court opined, would not serve as justification for gender-based peremptory challenges. 77 Just as the state's generalizations would be impermissible if made on the basis of race, they were impermissible when made on
78
the basis of gender.
68. Id. at 1422. The scientific evidence presented at trial established J.E.B.'s paternity
with 99.92% accuracy. Id. at 1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
69. ML
70. Id.
71. Id at 1422.
72. Id at 1430.
73. Id. at 1421.
74. Id. at 1425 (citations omitted).
75. Id. at 1426.
76. Id. The state maintained that its use of gender-based peremptory strikes was based
upon the belief that men, although otherwise qualified to serve on a jury, might be more
sensitive and responsive to the arguments of a man alleged to be the father of a child in a
paternity action, while women might be inclined to favor the complaining woman in such

suits. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1427. Explanations for exercising peremptory strikes against people of color
that were found by lower courts to be impermissibly based on race include: United States v.
Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 698 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that type of employment, age, and
residence were not sufficient non-race reasons under the circumstances); Roman v. Abrams,
822 F.2d 214, 228 (2d Cir. 1987) (refusing to accept the argument that potential jurors were
struck because their knowledge of electronics, bookkeeping, and computers may prevent
them from accepting the reasonable doubt standard), cert. denied 489 U.S. 1052 (1989);
United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that general references to a juror's unsatisfactory background and unspecified dissatisfaction with answers in
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The Court was quick to note, however, that its decision did not imply
the elimination of all peremptory challenges. 79 The Court held that its
ruling was not inimical to the state's legitimate interest in utilizing such
challenges to secure a fair and impartial jury.80 In other words, parties
may still use peremptory challenges to strike individuals whom they feel
are less suitable than other potential jurors or who are members of a
group or class not subject to heightened scrutiny.81 The Court's decision
simply disallows parties from using gender as a proxy for bias.8 2 Once a
prima facie showing of intentional discrimination based on gender has
been made, the party exercising the strike must offer a gender-neutral explanation for the strike.8 3 The party's justification need not rise to the
level of a cause challenge.8 4 Instead, the explanation must simply be gen5
der-neutral and may not serve as a pretext for discrimination.
C.

ConcurringOpinions

Justice O'Connor concurred in judgment with the majority but wrote
separately to discuss the costs associated with the Court's ruling against
gender discrimination. According to Justice O'Connor, the Court's decision will, like Batson, result in the proliferation of mini-hearings 8 6 concerning peremptory challenges and will further erode a device that plays
an essential role in securing a fair and impartial jury.87 She also asserted
juror's questionnaire fail to satisfy Batson); Pacee v. State, 816 S.W.2d. 856, 859 (Ark. 1991)
(striking juror because of "demeanor" was not a sufficiently specific race-neutral explanation); People v. Arrington, 843 P.2d 62, 64-65 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (removing juror peremptorily because juror had pending race discrimination suit against his employer was not
race-neutral and was invalid); State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 22 (Fla.) (ruling that peremptorily striking two African-Americans because they were "liberal" was not sufficiently race-neutral explanation when party failed to question the stricken jurors about their alleged bias),
cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988); Tolbert v. State, 553 A.2d 228, 232 (Md. 1989) (rejecting
prosecution's claim that it generally strikes young females where stricken jurors were 38 and
54 years of age respectively); Commonwealth v. Harris, 567 N.E.2d 899, 904 (Mass. 1991)
(holding that prosecution failed to articulate a race-neutral explanation for peremptory challenge of sole black juror when the prosecutor claimed that juror reminded him of the defendant's mother; that juror lived in location where defense witnesses lived; and that because
defendant's mother had become hysterical during the arraignment, as a black woman, the
juror might not be impartial); State v. Goode, 756 P.2d 578, 582 (N.M. Ct. App.) (stating that
"[b]y far the most common factor noted by courts holding a state's explanations to be pretextual is a varying treatment of white and nonwhite panel members"), cert. denied, 756 P.2d 1203
(N.M. 1988); State v. Walker, 453 N.W.2d 127, 135-36 (Wis.) (reversing defendant's conviction where prosecution's stated reason for striking prospective juror was that the prosecution
had no information about the prospective juror), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 962 (1990). See Douglas B. Dykes, Comment, Articulation of Non-Race Based Reasons for Peremptoy Challenges After
Batson v. Kentucky, 17 Am.J. TRAL ADvoc. 245, 264-65 & n.142 (1993) (examining unacceptable reasoning in the justification of purportedly race-based peremptory challenges).
79. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429.
80. Id.
81. Id
82. Id
83. Id. at 1429-30.
84. Id. at 1430.
85. Id.
86. Id. Justice O'Connor stated that "[iln further constitutionalizing jury selection procedures, the Court increases the number of cases in which jury selection-once a sideshowwill become part of the main event." Id. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
87. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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that by disallowing peremptory challenges based on gender, the Court decreases the litigants' ability to base their strikes on what are often accurate
gender-based assumptions about juror views. 8 8 Justice O'Connor concluded that the prohibition of gender-based peremptory strikes should not
be applied to private civil litigants or criminal defendants because they are
89
not, in her view, state actors when they exercise peremptory challenges.
Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment of the Court, wrote separately to explain that, pursuant to the legal framework required by equal
protection analysis, precedent leads to the conclusion that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits gender discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges. 90 According to Justice Kennedy, just as the Equal
Protection Clause forbids sex discrimination in the selection of jurors, it
prohibits peremptory challenges based on sex.9 1 His concurrence emphasized the importance of individual rights in equal protection analysis, in92
cluding the right of an individual to participate in the political process.
D.

Dissenting Opinions

Chief Justice Rehnquist authored a dissenting opinion in which he
asserted that race and gender discrimination are different. 93 In Batson,
the Court balanced the practice of peremptory challenges with the commands of equal protection and held that in the case of race-based peremptories equal protection was superior. 94 Chief Justice Rehnquist
concluded that the differences between race and gender discrimination,
however, indicate that when sex, not race, is at issue, the scales should tilt
95
in favor of peremptory challenges.
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas,
also dissented. Justice Scalia asserted that since all groups are subject to
peremptory challenges, gender-based peremptories do not result in the
denial of equal protection. 9 6 According to Justice Scalia, the Court's decision simply demonstrates the Justices' politically correct views in matters
pertaining to the sexes. 97 The result of this decision, which is neither
88. Justice O'Connor noted studies indicating that in rape cases, female jurors are some-

what more likely to convict than male jurors. Furthermore, she asserted that while there
have been no definitive studies, it is clear that a person's gender and resulting life experience
will impact an individual's view in sexual harassment, child custody, and spousal and child
abuse cases. Id at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 1432-33 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 1433 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
91. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 1433-34 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 1435 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice argued that while racebased classifications are subject to strict scrutiny, gender-based classifications are reviewed
under a heightened, but less strict standard. Furthermore, while racial groups make up numerical minorities in American society, the population is nearly equally divided between men
and women. Finally, according to the ChiefJustice, racial equality has proven to be a more
difficult goal to achieve than gender equality. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
94. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98-99).
95.

Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).

96. Id. at 1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 1436 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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mandated nor permitted by the Constitution, is the erosion of a practice
that historically has been an essential aspect of the right to a fair jury
trial. 98
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Benefits and Harms Engendered by the Use of the Peremptory Challenge

Proponents of the peremptory challenge point to its two distinct purposes. First, it serves as a "safety net" for challenges exercised for cause. 99
The peremptory allows the parties to reject a juror for a partiality they
cannot name or explain. 10 0 Thus, because it enables the parties to remove presumably biased jurors, the peremptory challenge is considered
one of the most effective means of securing a fair and impartial jury. 101
Furthermore, the peremptory challenge furthers the symbolic legitimacy of a fair jury trial. 10 2 This view finds its roots in fourteenth century
England, when Parliament eliminated the power of the king's attorneys to
exercise peremptory challenges.' 0 3 This action demonstrated the symbolic significance of a defendant's opportunity to play an active role in the
determination of the composition of the jury.10 4 The peremptory challenge is:
'a provision full of that tenderness and humanity to prisoners, for
which our English laws are justly famous.' With this tool, the defendant may dismiss from the jury, for any unspoken reason,
those he most hates or fears so that he is left with a 'good opin05
ion of the jury, the want of which might totally disconcert her.'
Pursuant to this principle, the defendant, who helped choose the jury, will
be satisfied with its composition and, therefore, the verdict will appear
fair. Further, because the verdict appears fair to the defendant, the community will also be confident that the judgment is just.10 6 Although the
modern American judicial system allows prosecutors, as well as defendants, to exercise peremptory challenges, the peremptory challenge still, in
some respects, retains the symbolic character first recognized in medieval
England.
Although the peremptory challenge may serve these important purposes, litigants' continued discriminatory exercise of this device and the
resultant harms of this discrimination call for the elimination of the peremptory challenge altogether. When a litigant is allowed to exercise her
98. Id. at 1439 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
99. Hayes, supra note 43, at 721.
100. See, e.g., MICHAEL SAKS & REID HASTIE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN COURT 55 (1978) (asserting that jury selection was, for centuries, the product of "hunches, unsymptomatic past
experience, intuition, [or] stabs in the dark"); see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 138 (Rehnquist, J.,

dissenting) (asserting that peremptory challenges are based on "seat of the pants instincts").
101. Swain, 380 U.S. at 217-18.
102. Tracey L. Altman, Note, Affirmative Selection: A New Response to Peremptory Challenge

Abuse, 38 STAN. L. REV. 781, 794 (1986).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. (quoting 4 WitLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *353) (citations omitted).
106. Id.
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peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner several harms result.
First, without the broad range of social experiences often found in groups
comprised of both sexes, juries may be ill-equipped to evaluate the facts
presented. 10 7 For example, all male juries may not understand the fear
and helplessness felt by battered wives who, in self defense, wound or murder their batterers.' 0 8 Misunderstanding important testimony relating to
gender issues, such as spousal abuse, can create the opportunity for un10 9
conscious prejudice.
Secondly, when potential jurors are excluded from juries because of
their gender, those excluded are deprived of their basic democratic right
to participate in the community's administration of justice. 10 Like the
right to vote, jury service is one of the most fundamental ways an individual citizen can participate in the democratic process.'' Serving as ajuror
can be an empowering experience, especially for women who historically
have been subjected to gender discrimination. When women are excluded from jury service because of their gender they are stigmatized by
the implication that they are not equals and that they are unable or unwill112
ing to be impartial.
Finally, discriminatory use of peremptory challenges undermines the
legitimacy of and confidence in the fairness of the justice system. 1 13 Women who are excluded because they are women see that the law is treating
them unequally with respect to jury service, and they may come to believe
that the law will treat them unfairly in other contexts as well. 114 Fairness
to litigants, inclusion of citizens of both sexes, and the integrity of the
justice system all demand that discrimination be recognized and eliminated in the exercise of peremptory challenges. As the following discussion demonstrates, in order to achieve this goal, peremptory challenges
must be abolished.
B.

PretextualReasoning

JE.B. will not eradicate gender discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges. Lower courts applying Batson and lower courts attempting to ban gender-based peremptory challenges prior to JE.B. have
found it difficult to distinguish between legitimate race and gender-neutral reasons for peremptory strikes and mere pretexts for discrimination.
When lower courts implement JE.B., they necessarily will have similar difficulties. While theJE.B decision is a historic step toward the elimination
107. Theodore McMillan & ChristopherJ. Petrini, Batson v. Kentucky: A Promise Unfulfilled, 58 UMKC L. REv. 361, 362 (1990).
108. See, e.g., Deborah L. Forman, What Difference Does it Make? Gender andJury Selection, 2

UCLA WOMEN'S LJ. 35 (1992).
109. Note, Developments in the Law: Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1472,
1559 (1988).
110. McMillan & Petrini, supra note 107, at 352.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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of gender discrimination in the jury selection process, it will simply eliminate the most blatant discriminatory peremptory challenges. Thinly disguised pretexts for gender discrimination, on the other hand, may survive
judicial examination. In light of this difficulty, the effort to remove discrimination from the jury selection process would be best served if peremptory challenges were eliminated altogether.
1. Pretextual Reasoning in Race-Based Peremptory Challenges
The evidentiary analysis required byjE.B.115 is identical to the analysis established by the Court in Batson.' 16 Lower courts have had difficulty,
however, implementing Batson, which suggests that the application of
JE.B. will be equally problematic. The difficulty arising from the application of Batson stems from litigants' use of pretextual reasoning in the justification of peremptory challenges. Litigants have become proficient at
offering acceptable reasons for their strikes,1 17 and the courts have readily
accepted these often pretextual explanations, which enables attorneys to
1 18
avoid the commands of Batson.
Significantly, the Supreme Court has provided almost no guidance to
the lower courts in assessing purportedly race-neutral explanations offered
by litigants. 119 In Batson, the Court merely noted that a litigant "must give
a clear and reasonably specific explanation of his legitimate reasons for
exercising the challenges." 120 While the Court held that a litigant's reasons must be related to the particular case to be tried, 12 1 this requirement
has failed to provide the lower courts with an adequate standard by which
to examine a litigant's proffered explanations.
Pursuant to this indefinite standard, lower courts have accepted justifications based on non-racial characteristics that are, in fact, merely racial
and ethnic surrogates. 12 2 Justifications for peremptories are clearly proxies for race and ethnicity when there is a dramatic statistical correlation
between the trait and race or ethnicity. 123 Studies, for example, have indicated that residence, especially in urban areas, often serves as a surrogate
115. SeeJE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430.

116. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
117. Id. at 106 (Marshall,J., concurring).
118. Andrew G. Gordon, Note, Beyond Batson v. Kentucky: A ProposedEthical Rule Prohibiting Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection, 62 FoRDHAm L. Rav. 685, 694 (1993) (discussing
lower court acceptance of pretextual explanations).
119. Id.; see Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371-72 (1991) (finding it unnecessary
to address the issue of pretext where prosecutor struckjurors because of their Spanish-speaking ability).
120. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.20 (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. Id. at 98.
122. Alschuler, supra note 5, at 175.
123. See Deborah A. Ramirez, Ecluded Voices: The Disenfranchisementof Ethnic Groups From
Jury Service, 1993 Wis. L. REa. 761, 789-91 (discussing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352,
371-72 (1992), and the statistical impact of excluding spanish-speaking latino jurors).
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for race or ethnicity. 12 4 As one court has stated, "[r]esidence ... acts as
125
an ethnic badge... [and] can be the most accurate predictor of race."
In United States v. Uwaezhoke,126 for example, an African-American defendant was on trial for participation in a drug conspiracy. 127 The defendant objected when the prosecutor peremptorily challenged an AfricanAmerican woman.1 28 The prosecutor explained that the woman was
stricken because, as a postal worker and a single parent who rented an
apartment in Newark, NewJersey, she "may be involved in a drug situation
where she lives." 129 The court held that the explanation was facially raceneutral.' 3 0 The prosecutor's explanation, however, was clearly based
upon unfounded stereotypes. He simply assumed that a single, black woman living in Newark would reside in low income housing and that areas
of low-income housing are drug infested.' 3 ' Thus, the potential juror's
race, her neighborhood, and crime and violence became amalgamated,
32
one serving as a surrogate for another.'
Additionally, lower courts have accepted justifications for peremptory
strikes against people of color where white jurors, exhibiting the same
characteristics that presumably prompted the peremptory strikes, remain
on thejury. l3 3 While some courts have held that the unequal application
124. See, e.g., Michael F. Potter, Note, Racial Diversity in Residential Communities: Societal
Housing Patterns and a Proposalfor a "RacialInclusionay Ordinance", 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1151,
1154 (1990) (finding that race determines housing patterns); Richard H. Sander, Comment,
IndividualRights and DemographicRealities: The Problem of FairHousing,82 Nw. U. L. R~v. 874,
875 (1988) (stating that "[e]very major metropolitan area in the United States still has a large
ghetto; in many cities, over eighty percent of the black population lives in virtually all-black
neighborhoods").
Litigants have argued that other characteristics also serve as racial and ethnic surrogates.
See, e.g., United States v. Mixon, 977 F.2d 921, 923 (5th Cir. 1992) (insufficient education);
United States v. Hinojosa, 958 F.2d 624, 631-32 (5th Cir. 1992) (same); United States v.
Hughes, 970 F.2d 227, 231 (7th Cir. 1992) (relatives with criminal records); United States v.
Johnson, 941 F.2d 1102, 1106-07 (10th Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Payne, 962 F.2d
1228, 1233 (6th Cir.) (group membership), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 811 (1992); United States v.
Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1157 (3d Cir. 1989) (religion), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 927 (1990);
United States v. Woods, 812 F.2d 1483, 1487 (4th Cir. 1987) (same); United States v. Cartlidge, 808 F.2d 1064, 1071 (5th Cir. 1987) (lack of substantial income); see also Gordon, supra
note 118, at 699-705 (discussing courts' willingness to accept explanations for peremptories
that are racial or ethnic surrogates).
125. United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 828 (9th Cir. 1992).
126. 995 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 920 (1994).
127. Id. at 389.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 393.
131. Gordon, supra note 118, at 700-01.
132. "Through mental association, African-Americans, their neighborhoods, crime and
violence all become amalgamated, giving rise to tenacious stereotypes-innocent and unintentional perhaps, but stereotypes nonetheless." Bishop, 959 F.2d at 828 (9th Cir. 1992).
Bishop held that the peremptory challenge of an African-American woman because she lived
in Compton, a neighborhood in South Central Los Angeles where seventy-five percent of the
residents were African-American, was a discriminatory racial proxy. Id. at 822, 827; see also
Gordon, supra note 118, at 702, 740 (discussing purportedly neutral explanations that are, in
fact, racial and ethnic surrogates).
133. Gordon, supra note 118, at 706.
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of peremptory challenges is unacceptable,1 3 4 other courts have allowed
such strikes even though they are clearly pretextual. 135
In United States v. Alvarado,13 6 for example, the prosecutor peremptorily struck an African-American juror with children the age of the defendant, claiming she might be unduly sympathetic.' 3 7 The prosecutor,
however, failed to strike white members of the venire with children of an
age similar to the defendant's.13 8 The trial court accepted the proffered
rationale.' 3 9 Although the Second Circuit noted that the force of a challenger's explanation for strikes against people of color is substantially
weakened by evidence that white members, to whom the same explanation
applies, were not challenged, the judicial officer was entitled to assess each
explanation in light of all the relevant evidence. 140 Despite evidence indicating the explanation was pretextual, the Second Circuit upheld the trial
court's finding.

14 1

Finally, peremptory challenges based on attorneys' subjective impressions are often accepted by lower courts. 1 42 As such impressions are essen134. See, e.g., Jones v. Ryan, 987 F.2d 960 (3d Cir. 1993) (refusing to accept the prosecution's proffered explanations because they were applied only to African-American jurors);
United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 698 (9th Cir. 1989) (disallowing strike against Hispanic who resided in La Mesa, California because prosecutor failed to strike a white juror
who lived in La Mesa); see also Gordon, supra note 118, at 706-07, 719 n.230 (citing Jones v.
Ryan).
135. See, e.g., United States v. Clemons, 941 F.2d 321, 324 (5th Cir. 1991) (accepting proffered explanation of youth, although nineteen-year-old white juror remained unchallenged);
United States v. Williams, 936 F.2d 1243, 1246 (11 th Cir. 1991) (accepting rationale for strike
of African-American woman because of her previous association with defense counsel, even
though several white jurors also had contact with defense counsel), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1279 (1992); United States v. Bennett, 928 F.2d 1548, 1551 (1 1th Cir. 1991) (allowing youth,
unemployment, and relatives with drug convictions as reasons for strikes of African-American
jurors, although one white juror was young and unemployed and another had been convicted of drug charges); Barfield v. Orange County, 911 F.2d 644, 648-49 (lth Cir. 1990)
(allowing strike of African-American woman because she worked for the school board, while
white women who worked for the school board were not stricken), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 954
(1991); United States v. Alston, 895 F.2d 1362, 1367 n.5 (lth Cir. 1990) (accepting strikes
against African-Americans based on age, family drug problems, and misunderstanding voir
dire questions, although white jurors exhibiting the same characteristics were not stricken);
United States v. Lance, 853 F.2d 1177, 1180 (5th Cir. 1988) (allowing strike of African-American, who was young and single, even though white juror exhibited the same characteristics);
see also Gordon, supra note 118, at 719 n.231.
136. 951 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1991).
137. Id. at 24.
138. Id. at 25.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 25-26.
141. Id. at 26.
142. Courts have accepted a variety of subjective impressions as explanations. See, e.g.,
Brown v. Kelly, 973 F.2d 116, 119 (2d Cir. 1992) (impressions of attitude; nervousness and
tone of voice), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1060 (1993); United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 457
(9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 928 (1987); Dunham v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc.,
967 F.2d 1121, 1124-25 (7th Cir. 1992) (impressions of eye contact); Reynolds v. Benefield,
931 F.2d 506, 512 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1204 (1991); United States v. Clemons, 941 F.2d 321, 323-24 (1991) (impressions of dress); United States v. Sherrills, 929 F.2d
393, 395 (8th Cir. 1991) (impressions of inattentiveness during voir dire); United States v.
Rudas, 905 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. Hendrieth, 922 F.2d 748, 74950 (lth Cir. 1991) (jurors' facial expressions); United States v. Ruiz, 894 F.2d 501, 506 (2d
Cir.) (same), aff'd, 894 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Terrazas-Carrasco, 861 F.2d
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tially unverifiable, they can easily hide discriminatory intent.143 Judges
rarely notice a particular juror's mannerisms and trial courts are not in a
position to assess an explanation based upon a subjective opinion. 144 Furthermore, appeals of such challenges are difficult, as written records can145
not support or negate an attorney's subjective impression.
In Barfield v. Orange County,146 for instance, a prosecutor claimed that
an African-American juror was peremptorily struck because she "was looking at me, and looking at my client, and looking at the Defendant's table
with an expression that conveyed to me some hostility, and it was my gut
feeling, based on her facial expression that she was likely to not be fair and
impartial to the [defendant]." 147 The trial court accepted the prosecutor's explanation, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, ruling that "[h]ostile
facial expressions and body language are legitimate" rationales for the exercise of a peremptory challenge.1 48 Subjective impressions, however,
such as that offered by the prosecutor in Barfield, are often affected by an
attorney's realized or unrealized racism. 14 9 Similarly, a judge's own big150
otry may lead her to accept an attorney's rationale as plausible.
Because of the similarities between race and gender discrimination
present in both the character of the prejudice and the analysis required by
the court, the problematic nature of the Batson decision necessarily foreshadows the difficulties lower courts will encounter in the application of
JE.B. Under Batson, litigants satisfy their rebuttal burdens by reciting unreviewable explanations that are merely pretexts for racial discrimination.
Because it is simply too difficult to review intelligently and accurately litigants' motives in the peremptory exclusion of jurors in the racial context
and, by implication, in the gender context, the peremptory challenge system should be eliminated.
2.

Pretextual Reasoning. in Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges

Prior to the Court's decision in Batson, state courts, unable to utilize
Sixth Amendmentjurisprudence in the examination of the validity of gender-based peremptories, 151 "turned to their own state constitutions and an
analysis of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution." 152 Therefore, years before the Supreme Court decided Batson and
JE.B., numerous state courts disallowed the use of both race-based and
93, 95 n.1 (5th Cir. 1988) (impressions of body language); United States v. Lance, 853 F.2d
1177, 1181 (5th Cir. 1988) (impressions of demeanor); United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d
1006, 1010-11 (5th Cir. 1987) (same); United State v. Cartlidge, 808 F.2d 1064, 1071 (5th Cir.
1987) (same); see also Gordon, supra note 118, at 719 nn.243-252 (citing court decisions
where peremptory challenges based on litigants' subjective impressions were accepted).
143. Gordon, supra note 118, at 709.

144. Id.
145. See id.
146. 911 F.2d 644 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 954 (1991).
147. Id. at 646.
148. Id. at 648.
149. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J.,concurring).

150. Id.
151. See discussion supraPart I.C.
152. See, e.g.,Jo, supra note 8, at 1315.
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gender-based peremptories.15 3 Furthermore, after the Court's decision in
Batson, several state and federal courts held that the Batson rationale extended to peremptory strikes motivated by gender.1 5 4 Thus, while lower
courts have not yet specifically applied J.E.B., an analysis of lower court
cases that proscribed the use of gender-based peremptory challenges demonstrates that, while J.E.B. may eliminate the most flagrant instances of
gender discrimination, the implementation of the decision will prove
problematic because courts routinely accept the pretextual explanations
offered by attorneys in defense of discriminatory peremptory challenges.
Like many purportedly race-neutral explanations, facially neutral rationales offered for the peremptory removal of women are often simply
surrogates for gender. Justifications for peremptories are surrogates for
gender when there is a high statistical correlation between the trait and
gender. Just as residence may serve as a proxy for race, employment in a
particular field often serves as a surrogate for gender. For example, women enter the field of nursing in dramatically higher numbers than men,
demonstrating a correlation between gender and nursing.155
In State v. Burch,156 a pre-J.E.B. decision, the Washington Court of
Appeals held that peremptory challenges on the basis of gender violated
1 57
both federal equal protection and the state's equal rights amendment.
The Burch court held that, under the circumstances, the defendant had
1 58
established a prima facie case of purposeful gender discrimination.
During rebuttal, the prosecutor claimed that one of the excluded women
jurors had been stricken because, as a nurse who worked at a women's
clinic, she would find the defense witness, also a woman, "extremely credible." 15 9 The court found this explanation sufficiently gender-neutral. 160
The prosecutor's rationale, however, was the product of uncorroborated stereotypes about women. She assumed that a nurse in a women's
clinic who acted as a caregiver to women would be sympathetic towards a
female witness and unable to be impartial. This explanation is not gender
neutral because it is "founded on gender stereotypes which view women as
generally governed by emotion, instinct, and feeling rather than reason,
judgment or common sense." 16 1 In this sense, the court allowed the fu153. See, e.g., People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978); Commonwealth v. Soares, 387
N.E.2d 499, 516 (Mass. 1979).
154. See, e.g., United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1426 (9th Cir. 1990); New York v.

Irizarry, 195 N.Y.S.2d 279, 280 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). But see United States v. Hamilton, 850
F.2d 1038, 1041 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990); State v. Oliviera, 534 A.2d
867, 870 (R.I. 1987).
155. Telephone interview with Lori Brotzman, Program Assistant, Office of Student and
Academic Support, University of Colorado School of Nursing, (June 2, 1994) (stating that
647 women and 43 men are enrolled in the University of Colorado School of Nursing).
156. 830 P.2d 357 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
157. Id. at 361-63.
158. Id. at 365.
159. Id. at 366.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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sion of the potential juror's sex, her profession, and a particular set of
162
characteristics, enabling one to serve as a surrogate for another.
Furthermore, as in the context of race-based peremptory challenges, 16 courts have accepted justifications for peremptories against women where men jurors with the same characteristics remain on the jury.
Although the mere presence of the unequal application of peremptories
evidences pretextual reasoning, courts continue to rule that such application does not warrant a finding of improper use of peremptories.
The court in People v. Inzarry' 6 found, pursuant to state prohibitions
and the federal constitution, gender-based peremptory challenges were
unlawful.' 65 The court held that the prosecution's challenges against female jurors established a prima facie case of gender-based discrimination. 166 Against a panel of an unusually high number of men, the
prosecutor challenged nine women and only one man.' 67 Furthermore,
the manner in which the peremptories were exercised showed an apparent attempt to rid the jury of women.1 68
The challenged women had diverse employment and family backgrounds, and, for the most part, the voir dire provided no anti-prosecution
inclination.' 69 In fact, several of the women had relatives who were police
officers, and others had been crime victims. 170 The men who were not
challenged disclosed information about themselves similar to the facts revealed by the challenged women.' 7 1 After the prosecution gave specific
explanations for the removal of the female jurors, the court ruled that
seven of the nine peremptory challenges were exercised for reasons independent of gender.17 2 Despite the prosecutor's failure to strike male
members of the venire with characteristics similar to those of the challenged females, the court ruled that the prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges was not pretextual and, thus, not unlawful.
Finally, courts have accepted explanations for the peremptory removal of prospective jurors based on litigants' subjective impressions. As
in the context of race, 173 subjective impressions can camouflage unlawful
motives. Litigants wishing to keep jurors of a particular sex off the jury
can merely provide the court with a subjective rationale based on an unverifiable impression, and, as noted above, courts are not equipped to
judge the validity of such impressions.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 133-41 and accompanying text.
536 N.Y.S.2d 630 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
Id. at 638.
Id. at 643.
Id. at 644.
Id.
Id.
Id.

171.

Id.

172. Id. at 645.
173. See supranotes 142-50 and accompanying text.
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In Mouzon v. PhiladelphiaHousing Authority,17 4 a woman employee
brought suit against her employer alleging gender bias and sexual harassment. 175 The plaintiff claimed the defendant's three peremptory challenges were exercised against female jurors on the basis of gender in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.1 76 During voir dire, one of the
excluded female jurors said she would find sexually explicit testimony embarrassing.1 77 The defendant claimed that, due to this statement and her
demeanor at the time she made the statement, the juror was hypersensitive and an unacceptable juror.1 78 The court found this explanation to be
gender neutral.1 79 It is possible, however, that the juror appeared hypersensitive, especially with respect to sexual matters, simply because traditionally women are seen as virginal and innocent. Thus, the attorney's
subjective impression of the juror, and the court's subsequent acceptance
of his explanation, may have been affected by sexist attitudes.
In light of lower court experience concerning the evaluation of litigants' purportedly gender-based explanations, it is apparent that JE.B. is
an imperfect remedy for gender discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges. Lower courts are not equipped to assess explanations that
are surrogates for gender-based classifications. The eradication of gender
discrimination in the context of the peremptory challenge can only be
achieved through the elimination of this device.
IV.

AFFIRMATIVE SELECTION

As discussed above, the peremptory challenge serves as a "safety net"
for challenges exercised for cause and represents the symbolic legitimacy
of the jury system. 1 80 As the preceding discussion illustrates, however, despite judicial regulation of peremptory challenges, such challenges allow
litigants to discriminate in the jury selection process.18 1 A new system
should be introduced into American courtrooms that will serve the valid
goals of peremptory challenges and preclude discrimination in the jury
selection process. An affirmative selection 182 system will accomplish these
tasks.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

No. CIV.A.93-3686, 1994 WL 197165 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 1994).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
See discussion supra Parts III.B.1. and III.B.2.
This method was originally proposed in Tracey L. Altman, Note, Affirmative Selection:

A New Response to Peremptory Challenge Abuse, 38 STAN. L. REv. 781 (1986).

Since the publica-

tion of Altman's Note, numerous scholars have endorsed this method, including Alschuler,
supra note 5; Harris, supra note 20; Heinz, supra note 34; and Hans Zeisel, Affirmative PeremptotyJuty Selection, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1165 (1987).
A number of commentators have suggested alternatives other than affirmative selection,
including the replacement of peremptories with a system of cause challenges, Gurney, supra
note 26, at 257-62; the expansion of the jury pool, id. at 262-66; the improvement of the
effectiveness of cause challenges, id. at 266; disallowing reliance on jurors' self-assessment of
bias, id. 266-68; the improvement of voir dire, id. at 268-73; the reduction of the number of
peremptories given to each side, id. at 274; the enactment of statutes that would restrict the
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The ProceduralRequirements

Like the current jury selection process, in an affirmative selection system, twenty-four venirepersons would be drawn randomly from the jury
pool.' 8 3 These twenty-four individuals would then be subject to voir dire
and challenges for cause.' 8 4 After challenges for cause, each party would
choose twelve jurors and list them in order of preference. The lists would
be submitted to the judge. Regardless of their rank, the judge would seat
on the petit jury those venirepersons who appear on both lists. 185 Next,
alternating between the lists, the judge would seat each party's selections
in descending order until the proper number of jurors is reached.
B.

186

Affirmative Selection Satisfies the Traditional Objectives of the Peremptory
Challenge

While the peremptory challenge system acts as a "safety net" for challenges exercised for cause and presumably allows the parties to secure an
impartial jury, l8 7 the affirmative selection system also allows for the selection of an impartial jury. First, affirmative selection guarantees a fair contest between the litigants. Since the parties have equal power to select
jurors, neither party has the opportunity to stack the jury in her favor.

188

Furthermore, because jurors who appear on the lists of both parties are
seated first, jurors who are suitable to both parties become part of the petit
jury. Finally, because the parties have equal ability to choose acceptable
application of peremptory challenges, Barbara A. Babcock, A Place in the Palladium: Women's
Rights and Jury Service, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 1139, 1176 (1993); the incorporation of an ethical
rule into the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct that would
prohibit discrimination against members of the venire during jury selection, Gordon, supra
note 118, at 713; and the adoption of a due process standard, Note, Due Process Limits on
ProsecutorialPeremptory Challenges, 102 HAav. L. Rav. 1013 (1989).
183. Altman, supranote 182, at 806.
184. Id.; see discussion supraPart I.A.
185. Altman, supranote 182, at 806.
186. Id. One commentator, in an effort to expand Altman's affirmative selection system,
recommends that after the judge seats those jurors who appear on both parties' lists the
remaining jurors should be subject to removal if, to the court's satisfaction, the moving party
provides a neutral explanation justifying their dismissal. The trial judge should permit these
challenges alternately, allowing each side to utilize as many strikes as the peremptory challenge system allows. Under this system, the trial judge should assess the similarities and differences between the challenged and unchallenged venirepersons to determine whether the
explanations for removal are based on specific biases not shared by other panel members. It
is in this manner, argues the commentator, that the trial judge should determine whether
the explanations are merely pretexts for discrimination. If both parties expend their challenges and the petit jury has not been empaneled, the judge should randomly select the
remaining jurors from the jury panel. Harris, supra note 20, at 1063.
This variation on Altman's affirmative selection system fails to remedy the problem of
pretextual reasoning engendered by peremptory challenges. As in the peremptory challenge
context, courts are not equipped to evaluate the validity of a litigant's purportedly neutral
explanation. A superficial examination of the similarities and differences between challenged and unchallenged venirepersons will not enable the judge to ferret out explanations
that are, in fact, surrogates for race or gender-based classifications, unequally applied to individuals on the venire panel, or based on a litigant's subjective impression of a particular
panel member. See discussion supra Parts III.B.1. and III.B.2.
187. See discussion supra Part III.A.
188. Altman, supra note 182, at 807.
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jurors if there is an insufficient number of mutually acceptable jurors,
each has the opportunity to seat those individuals whom she thinks may be
partial toward her case. 189 Therefore, assuming the litigants' choice of
jurors is influenced by their respective interests, affirmative selection produces a balanced jury. It "lets the parties determine which biases or community members are important to their cases, and their competing
190
interests should affect a balance of biases on the jury."
While the symbolic legitimacy engendered by the defendant's ability
to shape the composition of the jury through the exercise of peremptory
challenges is an important purpose of the challenge, this objective can be
accomplished in an equally satisfactory manner through the implementation of an affirmative selection system. Through this system, the defendant has the opportunity to choose one half of the jury and the jury will not
be seen as merely an extension of the prosecution. 19 1 Furthermore, to the
extent that affirmative selection allows for the inclusion of more minorities and for a more equal representation of both genders, "it promotes
public confidence in the jury since popular participation instills respect
for the system." 192 The replacement of peremptory challenges with affirmative selection will not destroy the confidence litigants and the public
have in the jury system, but will, in fact, promote it. Like the peremptory
challenge system, affirmative selection produces an impartial jury and promotes the symbolic legitimacy of the jury trial. Unlike the peremptory
challenge system, however, affirmative selection does not create a forum
in which pretexts for discrimination are accepted as reasonable explana193
tions for the exclusion of individuals from petit juries.
CONCLUSION

Eliminating gender-motivated peremptory challenges will take more
than the pronunciation by the Court in JE.B., because, despite the law,
attorneys will continue to employ peremptories in a discriminatory manner. The case of race-based peremptory challenges provides an unfortunate example of the persistence of racial stereotypes in courtrooms
through the use of pretextual reasoning. Similarly, in state and federal
courts where gender-motivated peremptory challenges have been disallowed, explanations given by attorneys and subsequently accepted by
judges to justify the removal of women jurors echo attempts to exclude
African-American jurors while presumably adhering to the mandates of
Batson. Experience, thus, demonstrates the necessity of abolishing the peremptory challenge system in order to rid our jury selection process of discrimination, not just in theory, but in fact.
Pamela R. Garfield
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 808.
Id.
See discussion supra Parts III.B.1. and III.B.2.

